Abstract-This paper presents a profit-maximizing offering strategy for a price taker power producer participating in the day-ahead spot market as organized under the Power Exchange model. The offering strategy maximizes profit by mitigating profit risk due to price forecast uncertainty leading to an imbalance arising from being accepted by the market operator (MO) to produce an infeasible dispatch schedule. The strategy makes use of a price forecast confidence interval to build hourly offer curves. The offering strategy is applied to realistic price scenarios as obtained from the Iberian MO. The performance is compared to alternative offering strategies using the agent-based OPTIMATE simulator. Results indicate that the offering strategy increases profit, reduces profit risk and reduces balancing costs arising from differences between the accepted and actual dispatch schedule. Consequently, the presented strategy outperforms the literature benchmark strategy in 83% of the cases.
Starting market round for which the offer is valid [hour] .
Ending market round for which the offer is valid [hour] .
Incurred fixed costs when operating according to price forecast scenario .
Variable production cost for operating at [ ].
"Fixed cost recovery" offer price when producing according to price scenario , in market round [ ].
Maximum (minimum) stable power output level of the plant [MW] .
Minimum duration, after start-up, at which the plant can be shut down [hour] .
Incurred fixed cost in case the plant produces according to .
Averaged upward (downward) gradient of the start-up (shut-down) power trajectory [MW/h].
Minimum stable power output duration before ramping up (down) [hour] .
Start-up cost of the plant .
Emerging market clearing price [ ].
Accepted production level by the MO, in market round [MW].
Least-cost production level, in market round , calculated after the market clearing process [MW] .
Ideal production level, in market round , calculated based on the emerging market clearing prices [MW] .
I. INTRODUCTION

P
OWER producers participating in the hourly-organized electricity spot market face two difficult problems. They need to decide the optimal next-day dispatch schedule of their portfolio and they need to determine offers so that this optimal dispatch schedule is accepted by the market operator (MO) which operates according to the rules of the Power Exchange. As is currently the case in European day-ahead electricity markets, power producers need to submit these decisions for each market round of the next-day market session.
Maximizing profit day-ahead of delivery exposes power producers to risk resulting from: 1) limited access to delayed information, 2) demand forecast uncertainty, 3) competitors' behavior, 4) renewable energy sources' production levels, 5) unexpected events such as forced thermal power plant or transmission line outages, 6) the impact of previously made decisions in terms of bilateral contracts or long-term obligations towards large customers, 7) the impact of concurrently organized auctions (e.g., ancillary services) or future ones (e.g., balancing markets), 8) operating constraints inherent to each type of production plant and 9) transmission constraints. All these uncertainties affect the actual emerging market clearing price in each market round. Short-term (i.e., next-day) price predictions typically exhibit white-noise errors ranging from 5% to 12%, severely harming the profit of the power producer if its response to above-mentioned problems does not adequately account for the price uncertainty range [1] , [2] .
The problem of determining the optimal portfolio dispatch schedule from the perspective of a price-taker power producer is handled by stochastic unit commitment (UC) and economic dispatch (ED) models [3] - [10] . Two broad categories are identified when representing profit risk: either a risk factor is included in the profit-based UC objective function, or the expected profit is maximized given a set of probable price scenarios or confidence intervals.
The variance of the expected profit was integrated in the expected profit maximization objective function to represent profit risk in [11] . A risk tolerance parameter determined the risk level the power producer was willing to expose itself to. A similar method was proposed by [12] to take ancillary services into account. The performance of both methods is proved highly sensitive to the value of the risk tolerance parameter. Alternatively, [13] proposes conditional value at risk (CVAR) to obtain less sensitive results. In return, this method produces more conservative solutions and is therefore more suited to manage longer-term market risks. As profit uncertainty is explicitly and directly integrated in the objective function of the UC and ED problem formulation, the optimal expected portfolio production schedule is obtained.
Instead of specifying a risk factor in the objective function, short-term price volatility is managed by defining price scenario trees. Such stochastic optimization technique has been combined with the real options model in [14] , while more recently [15] linked it with the above-mentioned CVAR method to determine a trade-off between allocating power production to weekly forward contracts and the short-term day-ahead spot market. Similarly, Monte Carlo simulation has been applied to tackle the problem in [16] . Due to the computational intensivity of the method, a trade-off is required between the amount of generated price scenarios and the accurate representation of the technical constraints in the self-scheduling problem. To reduce computational complexity, price scenarios can be confined to confidence intervals [7] , [17] , or alternative solution techniques, such as fuzzy logic [18] , [19] , genetic algorithms (GAs) [20] and control theory [21] can be used. The performance of the latter approaches has been found sensitive to the choice of parameters.
Although all methods provide a formal framework to maximize expected profit in the presence of profit risk, the effect of the market clearing process on profit is not taken into account as long as the optimal dispatch schedule is not complemented by a coherent strategy to translate the optimal dispatch schedule into offer curves. The determination of offer curves from the price taker power producer's perspective has received limited interest in literature, compared to the high academic interest in developing an anti-competitive offering strategy. Since the electricity market structure resembles more to an oligopoly than a perfect competitive market, this is understandable. Nevertheless, the development of a rational price taker profit-maximizing offering strategy, in which the power producer does not believe its offering strategy to affect the market clearing price outcome, is important in case such behavior is considered a benchmark to strategic market participants' behavior. This is especially true when researching the adequacy of an electricity market structure and management mechanisms or rules to direct the operation of the market towards maximal social welfare [22] .
Besides offering the optimal dispatch schedule at a single fixed price, mostly equaling the marginal production cost [23] - [27] , literature proposes few alternative offering strategies tailored to the needs of a competitive power producer. To the authors' knowledge, the majority of alternative strategies require perfect knowledge of the price distribution function, are computationally intensive due to the need of many price forecast scenarios, create smooth or piece-wise hourly offer curves, and/or create offers which do not reflect the actual cost of dispatching the portfolio. Consequently, these offering strategies cannot be generalized to be applied in real power markets [28] - [30] . On the other hand, the literature benchmark of offering the optimal dispatch schedule at marginal cost is argued not to be the norm for competitive offering [31] .
Without an offering strategy which represents the flexibility of the portfolio, imbalances between the optimal and accepted dispatch schedule might arise due to unforeseen price deviations. Consequently, the power producer is either contractually obliged to supply at a loss, must balance its accepted position using secondary markets, or suffers an opportunity cost in the face of profitable market clearing prices. Also known as the Winner's Curse, this effect is persistent over time and leads to a reduction in total profit and thus an increase in total profit risk [32] . Consequently, the authors argue the importance of developing an offering strategy to take into account arising imbalances caused by the market clearing process, in order not only to maximize day-ahead profit, but also to address costs related to future self-balancing requirements.
This paper highlights the impact of a flexible offering strategy on profit risk and balancing requirements. Three contributions are distinguished:
1) A novel risk hedging offering strategy for a price taker power producer is presented. The offering strategy aims to increase market session's profit by representing the technical flexibility of the portfolio in its offers. It is found to reduce risk, to increase profit and to mitigate exposure to future imbalances due to differences between the accepted and actual dispatch schedule.
2) The offering strategy is robust. Results show that the accurate representation of plant economics and physical constraints allows the strategy to perform well, even when the emerging market clearing price distribution is not fully represented by the price forecast tool. Additionally, good results are achieved with a low number of price scenarios, compared to alternative methods. 3) Two alternative offering strategies are applied as well in order to quantitively assess improvements in profit and balancing requirements. The optimality analysis focuses on how the offering strategy fares to obtain the maximum possible profit and therefore it allows the deduction of relevant, objective conclusions. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the price taker offering strategy. The proposed method is applied to a realistic case study in Section IV and the results are analyzed. Finally, Section V briefly formulates conclusions and discusses relevant future work.
II. RISK-CONSTRAINED OFFERING STRATEGY
The offering strategy assumes the availability of optimal dispatch schedules spanning the next-day market session, as obtained from a price-based UC and ED problem formulation of which the general form is given in (1). Technical and economic constraints are represented using the short-hand notation , , and . The problem formulation optimizes the price taker power producer's profit on a portfolio level, given price forecast scenario , in order to obtain each plant's optimal dispatch schedule , to be sold in each market round . Since this paper focuses on creating optimal offers from the UC and ED scheduling solutions, any self-scheduling problem formulation which accurately represents the economic and technical constraints of thermal power plants suffices [33] - [36] :
The optimal production levels are calculated from price forecast scenarios. Each price forecast scenario is derived from the price forecast distribution in market round , by connecting all hourly prices corresponding to the same percentile of each price forecast distribution. Consequently, dispatch schedules are calculated, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 in case three price forecast scenarios corresponding to the 5%, 50% and 95% percentile are selected. Note that is always strictly larger than . Comparing the dispatch schedules of two subsequent price scenarios and in market round , two situations can occur: either or . The first situation does not require hourly offers to be created to deal with price uncertainty between price scenarios and since no additional quantity is supplied to the market, and therefore no profit risk is associated with the price difference in market round . Consequently, it suffices only to discuss the second situation. Note that the situation does not emerge, since all hourly prices are larger in price scenario compared to price scenario . Consequently, any solution will result in a lower profit for the price taker power producer than if it would have pursued . To aid readability, the formal representation of the offer is denoted in the following form, in which corresponds to the indivisible part of the offer which at least needs to be supplied when the market operator (MO) accepts the offer and equals to the maximum quantity offered at offer price . Since only hourly offers are created, equals :
The optimal dispatch schedule proposes the power producer to supply the market with at price . Consequently, poses an upper bound on the price needed by the price taker power producer to produce. As such, the offer price associated with cannot be larger than , even if this offer price causes the price taker power producer to produce at a loss during market round . In fact, as the dispatch schedule is optimal, limiting the offer price to keeps the likelihood of this hourly loss being compensated in following, more profitable market rounds, consistent with the likelihood of emerging prices to exceed the ones denoted by the price scenario. Consequently, the likelihood of being rejected by the MO in market round , which in turn results in an infeasible accepted dispatch schedule, is reduced.
In case supplying the market is profitable during market round , the power producer will pursue a "fixed cost recovery" pricing scheme, whose objective is to generate sufficient revenue throughout the whole market session in order to cover the total variable and fixed costs incurred by producing according to the optimal dispatch schedule. Note that losses incurred by producing during unprofitable market rounds are included in this price mark-up.
Increasing hourly offer prices increases the likelihood of the offer being rejected. This risk is ideally kept as small as possible over all profitable market rounds. The total cost to be recovered, excluding variable production costs, is therefore distributed proportionally to the yield between the price forecast associated with scenario and the variable production cost. The following equation is solved to obtain the proportion , which is then used to calculate the "fixed cost recovery" offer price in each individual profitable market round by adding the "fixed cost recovery" price mark-up to the marginal production cost. Note that the "fixed cost recovery" offer price in unprofitable market rounds is consistent with price forecast scenario and equals :
Consequently, the offer submitted to supply to the market is represented by (2) in case and by (3) otherwise. As such, the start-up and the shut-down trajectories are explicitly represented by the offer, as well as the minimum stable power output level:
The price taker power producer also has an incentive to produce up to in case the price reaches . Consequently, poses an upper bound on the price needed by the price taker power producer to produce the additional quantity . The price taker power producer must offer this quantity at an offer price strictly larger than in order to (1) guarantee the acceptance of all previous offers prior to the acceptance of the offer to produce up to , and (2) not to produce at price . All total variable and fixed costs incurred for producing the optimal dispatch schedule are recovered in a similar manner as the "fixed cost recovery" pricing scheme described previously. Analogously, the final "fixed cost recovery" offer price , associated to price scenario and market round , is limited to to keep the likelihood of being accepted consistent with the likelihood of emerging prices to exceed the values denoted by price scenario . Finally, the price taker power producer submits (4) in case in order to comply to start-up or shut-down trajectories, (5) in case but , and (6) in case :
Above-mentioned offers are submitted for each price scenario, each market round and each thermal plant in the portfolio. As such, the offering strategy is iterated times per plant. In order to avoid offer duplicates, quantity is only offered once.
All market participants are obliged to submit the whole available capacity of their production portfolio to the MO. In case a plant has not been dispatched at full capacity according to the optimal dispatch schedule , the remaining capacity still needs to be offered. The price at which to offer the remaining capacity is bounded downward by . Although no upper bound exists except for the market ceiling price, a price taker power producer only has an incentive to marginally increase its offer price beyond . Consequently, in case because of compliance to start-up or shut-down power trajectories, the offer is represented by (7) . In case , it is described by (8):
The previous process is iteratively continued until all price scenarios and all market rounds in the market session have been addressed. Finally, the created offers are aggregated to form an offer curve which is submitted to the MO. The whole process is illustrated schematically in Fig. 3 .
In case , the plant is assumed not to be dispatched. However, in order to comply to the obligation to submit the whole capacity, offer (9) is created. Note that the "fixed cost recovery" offer price includes the minimum operational time after start-up and the start-up costs:
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The following numerical example facilitates the comprehension of the method. Consider a power plant with variable cost and start-up cost equal to . Also consider the plant to operate between 5 MW and 20 MW. The ramping rate is 5 MW/h, while the gradient during the start-up and shut-down trajectories equal 2.5 MW/h. Assume a single market round in the market session of which the scheduling problem solution is given in Table I for each scenario.
The first scenario does not advise a dispatch of the plant. Consequently, no offer is created to account for this scenario. TABLE I  THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO PARAMETERS   TABLE II  THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO PARAMETERS The second scenario dispatches the plant at a level lower than the minimum stable power output level which indicates the plant is following its start-up trajectory throughout the envisaged market round. Since no former offer has been submitted and the calculated "fixed cost recovery" offer price is larger than the anticipated market clearing price, the optimal dispatch schedule is submitted at . Consequently, the first offer in Table II is created.
The third scenario does not indicate an increase of optimal power production level during the market round. No additional offer is therefore created. The fourth scenario reaches the minimum stable production power output level at a "fixed cost recovery" offer price equal to . Since this price does not violate the price limits between which the scenario is valid, i.e., and , this price level is the most competitive one at which the offer can be priced.
The fifth scenario increases the production output level to 10 MW. Since the plant is now operating between its minimum and maximum stable power production limits, no indivisible part is defined. The "fixed cost recovery" offer price is however smaller than the anticipated price of the previous scenario, so that this offer is priced at a marginally higher level than the maximum anticipated price of the former scenario. Lastly, the remaining capacity of the plant is fully divisibly offered at a marginally higher price than the anticipated price according to the last price scenario. The full offer curve is presented in Table II . In both cases, the marginal increase equals .
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Simulation Platform
In order to test the performance of the presented offering strategy, the prototype of the agent-based OPTIMATE simulator is used. The OPTIMATE simulator is a numerical test platform created for the analysis of actual market designs and validation of new ones which may allow integrating massive intermittent generation dispersed in several regional power markets [37] . OPTIMATE will therefore contribute to the construction of a pan-European electricity market adapted to climate policy and security of supply concerns. The OPTIMATE platform is unique since it intends to replicate the sequence of electricity markets. The simulator is implemented using the C++ programming language and is currently commercially available in its sequential computational form [38] .
The agent-based OPTIMATE simulator adds a layer of complexity in order to model the interaction between market participants (generators, consumers, portfolio managers, renewable, TSOs, etc.) more realistically. The agent-based simulator covers the operation of the day-ahead spot market. Individual market participants owning a portfolio ranging from renewable to hydro and thermal plants can be represented. Each market participant decides its optimal offer curve without knowledge of competitors' actions, but according to their forecast of the residual demand curves based on historic data published by the MO. The market participants schedule their portfolio and create offers to submit to the MO. The market clearing mechanism realistically mimics the process as currently instated to clear the electricity markets in the CWE region. The MO then communicates the accepted dispatch schedules back to the market participants. The market participants finally reschedule their portfolio in order to minimize the cost while producing the accepted dispatch schedule.
Since the presented offering strategy aims at maximizing profit while maintaining balancing responsibilities after the day-ahead market clearing process due to accepted dispatch schedule infeasibility, the agent-based OPTIMATE simulator prototype is suited as simulation platform.
In this paper, a single power producer is envisaged, facing a flat residual demand curve. Its portfolio consists of 6 thermal plant types, ranging from base power to peak power plants. The Table III . Market participants are assumed to use the UC and ED mixed-integer linear problem (MILP) formulation as presented in [8] to maximize profit based on price forecasts, as well as to minimize production costs when contractually obliged to produce the accepted dispatch schedule. The problem formulation consists of 36 variable groups and 72 constraint groups for a single market session. For the envisaged portfolio, this leads to a model containing 44 034 discrete variables, 52 129 continuous variables and 451 723 constraints. The problem to create the offers is solved in 4.7 min per price forecast scenario, using the GLPK solver in C++ [39] , on a machine with a 2.83-GHz processor and 3.84 GB of RAM memory.
Note that this paper focuses on accurately representing the optimal dispatch schedule to be submitted to the MO operating the day-ahead spot market. Alternative UC and ED models than the one used for this case study can be applied as well, e.g., models integrating energy supply to AGC, spinning and nonspinning reserve markets [40] , [41] . Although the choice of the model will affect the optimal dispatch schedule to be offered in the day-ahead spot market, the conclusions of this paper are not affected. Since all optimal dispatch schedules are calculated based on the same MILP model, the performance of each strategy is solely dependent on the used offering strategy.
B. Simulation Setup and Data Generation
The simulation setup is retrieved from the Iberian electricity market as emerged on the 12th of March 2008 [42] . In this setup, a market participant has to submit offers to the MO, facing a real price uncertainty as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The full black line denotes the actual emerging market clearing price on that day. The price uncertainty is calculated based on the emerging market clearing prices from January 2008 to the 11th of March 2008 as available on the website of the Iberian MO [43] . The real distribution of hourly prices is assumed unknown, however, the power producer is assumed to have available a price forecast tool which predicts hourly next-day prices by means of autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) techniques (Fig. 1) . Although the price forecast tool is able to approach the real price uncertainty during the market session, discrepancies arise during individual market rounds, allowing the emerging market clearing price to significantly differ from the predicted price.
In order to assess the performance and robustness of the offering strategy, 100 emerging market clearing price outcomes have been created by calculating the covariance matrix between the 24 hourly price distributions as presented in Fig. 4 . The offers are created according to the price forecast distribution presented in Fig. 1 . Consequently, 100 market sessions are simu- lated in which an identical set of offers is cleared by the MO according to different market clearing price outcomes. One such emerging price outcome is highlighted in Fig. 4 . As such, the performance and robustness of the offering strategy is statistically assessed given an imperfectly known price distribution and a variety of plant types.
Two alternative offering strategies are implemented in order to better situate the performance of the presented offering strategy. The "literature benchmark" strategy offers the optimal expected dispatch schedule of each plant at its marginal production cost, similar to the strategy used in most literature. The "robust optimization" strategy is retrieved from [17] . It constructs an offer curve by offering an increase in production level in market round at the hourly price denoted by the price scenario. Price scenarios are obtained by decreasing all hourly prices from the maximum envisaged price scenario down to the minimum envisaged price scenario.
C. Results
Two key performance indicators have been identified to objectively assess the performance of the strategy.
Firstly, the obtained profit is benchmarked to the maximum attainable profit each market session. The obtained profit is calculated by subtracting the cost for producing the actual dispatch schedule from the revenue. Revenue is calculated by multiplying the emerging market clearing price with the minimum of the accepted and the actual production output level. The maximum profit is obtained by calculating the optimal dispatch schedule under perfect knowledge of the market clearing prices. This corresponds to (10): (10) Fig. 5 illustrates the distribution of the performance to attain maximum profit in terms of the followed offering strategy. The "literature benchmark" strategy (LB) only offers according to the price scenario of the price forecast distribution at the 50% percentile, while the "Presented" (P) and "Robust" (R) strategy make use of more price scenarios as illustrated by the number in brackets. All strategies divide the 90% confidence interval of the price forecast distribution uniformly in smaller intervals. The data is plotted in boxplot format in order to visually observe the expected value and the uncertainty.
The presented offering strategy outperforms all other strategies in terms of attaining maximum profit. All presented offering strategies achieve on average 91.2% to 91.9% of the maximum attainable profit, while this number equals 86.2% for the benchmark strategy and 79.6% to 81.2% for the robust strategy. Although the profit increase averages out on five percentage point compared to the benchmark case, the absolute profit increases 6.1% on average.
A beneficial effect on profit risk is also observed. Using the presented strategy, in 90% of the cases, at least 80.3% of the maximum profit is obtained, while this number drops to 68.3% and 44.4% compared to the benchmark and robust strategy. It is also observed that good results are already obtained when using the lowest amount of price scenarios to create the offers.
This case study therefore shows that profit is increased, and profit risk reduced, by representing the flexibility of the portfolio through the offers. The offering strategy attains more than 90% of the maximum profit using the lowest number of price scenarios or price quantiles. The performance only increases 0.7% in case the number of price scenarios is doubled, illustrating the method's robustness and computational efficiency, even in case the actual price distribution is not perfectly represented by the forecast price distribution. Since the number of price scenarios is the method's sole user-defined input parameter, the method is argued to illustrate a lower sensitivity to input parameters compared to alternative methods. Consequently, even though a price taker power producer does not have the market power to alter the market clearing price to its own advantage, deviating the offer price away from the marginal production costs is a rational strategy to hedge against profit risk.
Secondly, the change in obtained profit between two offering strategies is compared to the change in total daily imbalance between the accepted and produced dispatch schedules. This indicator allows the deduction of relevant conclusion on how the offering strategy impacts the balancing cost. Four possible outcomes can be observed. In case the profit increases while imbalances increase, the cost related to the increase in balance should be offset by the increase in day-ahead profit. As such, the metric serves as an upper bound for the balancing costs below which it is justified to make use of the offering strategy. Similarly, a lower bound of balancing costs is obtained when profit and imbalances both decrease. An increase in profit and a decrease in imbalance illustrates the superiority of the analyzed offering strategy, while a decrease in profit and an increase in imbalances shows the inferiority of the strategy. The "literature benchmark" strategy is chosen to be the benchmark strategy for this indicator. The imbalance is calculated using (11):
(11) Fig. 6 illustrates the result in case the performance of the presented strategy using 7 price scenarios is compared to that of the benchmark strategy. In 54 cases, a larger profit was achieved at a lower imbalance, illustrating the capability of the presented offering strategy to increase profit while decreasing imbalances. On the other hand, 7 cases illustrate a better performance of the benchmark offering strategy. The remainder of cases obtain a higher profit, but also incur a larger imbalance. The additional obtained day-ahead profit per unit of imbalance is only profitable if the actual self-balancing costs are lower. An imbalance cost of is drawn on the figure to illustrate that, in most cases, the additional profit outweighs the cost for balancing when using the presented offering strategy.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the actual, optimal and accepted dispatch schedules for the market session in which the presented offering strategy achieves its highest loss and imbalance compared to the benchmark offering strategy. The presented offering strategy closely follows the optimal dispatch schedule during market rounds 9 to 24 thanks to the "fixed cost recovery" pricing scheme. Additionally, it can be observed that the optimal dispatched schedule is closely followed by the accepted dispatched schedule during market rounds 3 to 7 as well. Therefore, the strategy is more profitable than the benchmark strategy during these market rounds. However, the performance of the strategy during the first and the eighth market round is worse than that of the benchmark strategy. During the first market round, the emerging price equals . Consequently, the benchmark strategy succeeds to be accepted for Fig. 7 . Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing the benchmark offering strategy, during the best performing market session compared to the presented strategy. Fig. 8 . Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing the presented offering strategy using 7 price scenarios, during the worst performing market session compared to the benchmark strategy.
all its base power plant capacity, while the presented offering strategy is only accepted for its first plant type capacity, since the "fixed cost recovery" offer price associated with the second plant type capacity equals . In market round eighth, the emerging price equals , a jump of compared to the emerging price in market round 7. It can be observed that both the benchmark and presented offering strategy do not cope well with the sudden price increase, however, the "fixed cost recovery" pricing scheme exacerbates this effect.
The effect is also illustrated in Fig. 9 , which represents the offer curve created by each offering strategy subject to a price forecast of . The offer prices of the presented strategy are increased for all base power plants in order to account for fixed costs, while a mark-down is visible for the peak power plant since the self-scheduling solution dictates the plant to ramp up in order to profit from subsequent, more profitable market rounds. Combining the rejection of all mid type power plants in market round 7 with the acceptation of all mid type and one peak type power plant in market round 8, the presented offering strategy suffers a larger imbalance than the benchmark strategy.
Note however that an inter-hourly price increase of 37% is not practically common in realistic electricity markets. Also note Fig. 9 . Offer curves for each strategy, as submitted for hour 8, during the benchmark strategy's best performing market session compared to the presented strategy.
in Fig. 6 that, although the imbalance is large, the day-ahead loss is limited. It is thus concluded that the presented offering strategy generally outperforms the benchmark offering strategy while hedging profit risk.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel price taker offering strategy to maximize profit while accounting for imbalances arising from being accepted by the MO to produce an infeasible dispatch schedule. The offers created by the strategy take into account technical constraints and plant economics. The strategy has been applied to a realistic case study inspired on the Iberian electricity market, using the prototype of the agent-based OPTI-MATE simulator. The offering strategy does not require a detailed representation of the price forecast distribution and is proved largely insensitive to the number of user-specified price forecast scenarios. The offering strategy also produces stepwise offer curves at a low computational cost, which render it practically applicable.
Comparing the offering strategy to alternative strategies shows that profit is increased by 6.1% and that the offering strategy obtains at least 80.3% of the maximum attainable profit in 90% of the cases. Although imbalances are reduced in 54% of the cases compared to the benchmark strategy, the offering strategy outperforms the benchmark strategy in 83% of the cases. Consequently, it is argued that the literature benchmark strategy does not reflect rational behavior of a price taker power producer.
However, it is also noted that the performance of the presented hourly offering strategy drops in an electricity market with high price volatility between neighboring market rounds or in case self-balancing costs are high. Therefore, future work will include multi-hourly price-quota pairs to handle such volatility and uncertainty.
